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LAWYERS AND BAR ASSOCIATIONS
AS INFLUENCERS IN THE
NEGOTIATED LANDSCAPE OF
SOCIAL-BUSINESS HYBRIDIZATION
Michael E. Cummings * and Hans Rawhouser *
I. Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increasing convergence of the for-profit
and non-profit sectors. Many for-profit businesses are becoming more missionoriented, while non-profits are pushing to become financially sustainable by
increasing revenue-generating activities. This convergence has led to state-level
adoption of variations on traditional organizational forms,1 in line with Supreme
Court Justice Brandeis’ observation that “a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”2 Corporate entities law is
in the midst of such an experiment marked by the legal creation of new hybrid
forms of organizing—forms that explicitly combine characteristics of purposedriven and profit-driven organizations.
* Michael E. Cummings is an assistant professor of management at the University of Arkansas
Walton College of Business. Ph.D., Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship, University of
Minnesota Carlson School of Management (2015); M.P.A., Public Management, Brigham Young
University Marriott School of Management (2010); J.D., Brigham Young University J. Reuben
Clark Law School (2008); B.S. English Literature, Utah Valley University (2005). Dr. Cummings’
research focuses at the convergence of law, policy, and entrepreneurship.
* Hans Rawhouser is an assistant professor of entrepreneurship at UNLV’s Lee Business
School. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota’s Carlson School of Management,
MBA from Thunderbird School of Global Management, and B.S. in Civil Engineering from
UNLV. He investigates how entrepreneurs acquire resources and the efforts of organizations to
achieve social impact.
1
See generally J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 Md. L. Rev.
541 (2016).

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932); see also J. Haskell Murray, supra
note 1, at 563 –564.
2
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Creation of these new legal forms requires innovation and negotiation of
the boundaries between for-profit and non-profit models of organizing. This
article examines how various actors’ formal participation in the legislative
process shapes the conversation and negotiated boundaries of these types of
policy innovations. This article primarily focuses on Benefit Corporations and
Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies (L3C), the two most prevalent social
business legal forms in the United States, and on the role of attorneys and bar
associations in shaping the creation of these forms of organization.3
To complement prior legal scholarship on the Benefit Corporation and
L3C movements4—which focused on comparing the nuances in various states’
legal approaches, or compared firms’ adoption rates across jurisdictions—this
article focuses on understanding the various interests that shaped these laws in
different states.5 This article analyzes a diverse and content-rich product of the
legislative process: transcripts and written testimony from over 100 separate
committee hearings and legislative floor debates. This approach to understanding
the legislative process helps identify patterns and tensions between actors with
similar but divergent interests. Although these potential tensions are present
between several different groups involved in this process, such as business
owners, nonprofit leaders, legislators and other public officials, this article mainly
focuses on the policy development involvement of the legal community—
attorneys and bar associations.6

See generally Hayagreeva Rao, Calvin Morrill & Mayer N. Zald, Power Plays: How
Social Movements and Collective Action Create New Organizational Forms, in 22 Research in
Organizational Behavior 237, 237–281 (Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton, eds., 2000); Hans
Rawhouser, Michael Cummings & Andrew Crane, Benefit Corporation Legislation and the Emergence
of a Social Hybrid Category, 57 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 13 (2015).
3

4
See e.g. Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote
the Public Interest, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 578 (2012); Frederick H. Alexander et al., M&A Under
Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Statute: A Hypothetical Tour, 4 Harv. Bus. Rev. 255 (2014);
Alissa Mickels, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-Benefit
Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L.
Rev. 271 (2009); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and
Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2012); Rawhouser, Cummings & Crane, supra
note 3.
5
Given that it is outside the scope of our article, we acknowledge, but do not substan
tively address, the issue of whether new hybrid organizational forms are necessary or effective.
For a summary of some critiques, see e.g. Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit
Corporation: A Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 St. Mary’s L. J. 617 (2012);
Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The ‘Emperor’s New Clothes’ on the Low-Profit Limited
Liability Company, 35 Del. J. Corp. L. 879 (2010); Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit
Corporation: An Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62
Emory L. J. 999 (2012–2013).

In addition to our review of each bill’s legislative history, we also contacted state bar
association representatives directly to supplement the information that was present in the legislative record.
6
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Each group’s testimony is examined in turn, permitting qualitative analysis
of the nature and extent of their testimony in various states. This analysis
reveals interesting patterns regarding the existence (or lack) of a legal need for this
type of legal entity. For example, while individual lawyers who testify before the
legislature tend to enthusiastically support the idea of social hybrid legislation,
state bar associations counterbalance this enthusiasm with workable policy,
ranging from tacit approval and minor revisions to large scale re-drafting of
proposed legislation. Some associations even oppose the social hybrid legislation
outright. Our study plays an important role in understanding the messengers
(and messages) shaping this convergence of for-profit and non-profit (hybrid)
organizational models.
The concept of convergence is especially relevant because organizations
have historically been categorized as fitting within the public, the private, or the
non-profit sector. But even with relatively strong boundaries between sectors,
organizations have partnered and collaborated across these sectoral divides (i.e.,
public-private partnerships for urban development, corporate philanthropy for
poverty reduction, etc.).7 New hybrid organizational forms take this idea of
bridging sectoral boundaries one step further. Rather than two organizations
with separate but complementary purposes collaborating on an area of shared
interest, single hybrid organizations have attributes (and purposes) of both
private and non-profit entities. Public vs. private benefit, or social vs. financial
organizational purposes, are increasingly intertwined and indivisible.
Movement toward the middle has been incremental and has originated
from both the nonprofit and for-profit sectors.8 Within the for-profit sector,
practices such as impact investing,9 sustainability certifications,10 and corporate

7
See e.g. John Peloza & Loren Falkenberg, The Role of Collaboration in Achieving Corporate
Social Responsibility Objectives, 51 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 95 (2009); Young Hoon Kwak, YingYi
Chih & C. William Ibbs, Towards a Comprehensive Understanding of Public Private Partnerships
for Infrastructure Development, 51 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 51 (2009); Paola Perez-Aleman & Marion
Sandilands, Building Value at the Top and the Bottom of the Global Supply Chain: MNC-NGO
Partnerships, 51 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 24 (2008); Mike Valente & Andrew Crane, Public Responsibility
and Private Enterprise in Developing Countries, 52 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 52 (2010).

Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, 10 Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev. 51, 51–55
(2012); Hans Rawhouser, Michael E. Cummings, and Scott Newbert, Social Impact Measurement:
Current Approaches and Future Direction for Social Entrepreneurship Research, Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice, forthcoming.
8

9
See Antony Bugg-Levine & Jed Emerson, Impact Investing: Transforming How We Make
Money while Making a Difference, 6 innovations: Tech., Gov. & Globalization 9 (2011), http://
www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/INOV_a_00077.
10
E.g. Nichols Institute for Envtl. Pol’y Sols., An Overview of Ecolabels and
Sustainability Certifications in the Global Marketplace, 14–15 (Jay S. Golden ed., 2010),
https://www.academia.edu/20586265/An_Overview_of_Ecolabels_and_Sustainability_
Certifications_in_the_Global_Marketplace.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2017

3

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 17 [2017], No. 2, Art. 3

460

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 17

social responsibility (CSR) activities11 have become increasingly important.
Over time, these corporate social initiatives have become more strategic,12 and
directly aligned with the corporation’s competencies.13 In the non-profit sector,
organizations are becoming more focused on performance measurement and
mission-related income-generating activities.14 Paradigm convergence, and the
recognition of the need to blend social and financial value, has led to the creation
of new social hybrid organizational forms that mix and match characteristics of
both purpose-driven and profit-driven organizations.15
This combination and experimentation seems exciting and groundbreaking,16
but in order for social hybrids to gain collective strength and widespread impact,
states have to carefully negotiate rules and boundaries to clarify the differences
between the hybrid organization and its two respective parent organizational
forms.17 This article explores this boundary negotiation process, focusing
specifically on the role of lawyers and bar associations in shaping dialogue and
subsequent legislation providing for the formation and maintenance of social
hybrid organizations.
The Section II briefly outlines the types and history of legal forms established
for social-business hybrids in the United States, with specific attention to
Benefit Corporations and L3Cs. What follows in Section III is a discussion of
the historical role of bar associations’ involvement with shaping state law, both

E.g. Dylan Minor & John Morgan, CSR as Reputation Insurance: Primum Non Nocere, 53
Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 40 (2011).
11

See e.g. Christine Vallaster, Adam Lindgreen & François Maon, Strategically Leveraging
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Corporate Branding Perspective, 54 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 34 (2012);
Michael. E. Porter & Mark. R. Karmer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage
and Corporate Social Responsibility, Harv. Bus. Rev. December 2006, at 78.
12

13
David Hess, Nikolai Rogovsky & Thomas W. Dunfee, The Next Wave of Corporate
Community Involvement: Corporate Social Initiatives, 44 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 110 (2002).
14
William J. Ritchie & Robert W. Kolodinsky, Nonprofit Organization Financial Performance
Measurement: An Evaluation of New and Existing Financial Performance Measures, 13 Nonprofit
Mgmt. & Leadership 367 (2003).
15
Jed Emerson, The Blended Value Proposition: Integrating Social and Financial Results, 45
Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 33 (2003).
16
Jacob E. Hasler, Note: Contracting for Good: How Benefit Corporations Empower Investors and
Redefine Shareholder Value, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1279 (2014); Michael R. Deskins, Benefit Corporation
Legislation, Version 1.0—A Breakthrough in Stakeholder Rights?, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1047
(2011); William H. Clark Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, Business Organizations: When “Business
Purpose” Disappears: How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations,
38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 817 (2012).
17
This issue of ideal statutory design is an important one. A good idea, if poorly executed,
will be ineffective. J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and Statutory Design,
26 Regent U. L. Rev. 143 (2013); Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How
Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J. L. &
Soc. Pol’y 170 (2012).
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generally and specifically with regard to new innovations in organizational
forms. Section IV summarizes the involvement of bar associations with this
legislation, based on oral and written testimony on social hybrid bills introduced
in several state legislatures, and discusses the origins and outcomes of differences
between bar associations and their individual member attorneys. Finally, Section
V discusses implications for association practice and research on new organiza
tional forms.

II. Background
While organizations combining profit and purpose are not new, some have
complained that the legal frameworks within which they have operated are often
ill-suited to their needs. More recently, this has led to the proposal of various
hybrid legal forms among the U.S. states. These include: Benefit Corporations,
Benefit Limited Liability Companies,18 L3Cs, Social Purpose Corporations,19 and
Flexible Purpose Corporations.20 Regardless of their differences, these legal forms
are each hybrid—they draw attributes from both profit-oriented legal forms
(e.g. corporations and limited liability companies) and purpose-oriented nonprofit legal forms (e.g. charitable and philanthropic organizations), which have
previously been considered distinct and separate organization types.
These new social business forms represent a type of policy experiment
made possible by the U.S. federalist system.21 The experiment is widespread and
ongoing. Between 2010–2015, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia
adopted Benefit Corporation legislation.22 Additionally, a handful of additional
state Benefit Corporation laws have been passed or are in progress during the
2016 –17 legislative sessions.23 In comparison, the L3C form saw earlier success,
with thirty-four states considering legislation and nine states adopting between
2008 and 2011.24 However, the movement had lost momentum;25 Puerto Rico
18

E.g. S.B. 595-500, 428th Sess. (Md. 2011).

Social Purpose Corporation, Washington Secretary of State, https://www.sos.wa.gov/
corps/socialpurposecorporation.aspx (last visited May 2, 2017).
19

20
See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing: Flexible Purpose Corporations, 2
Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 55 (2012).
21

Murray, supra note 4, at 45.

Carter G. Bishop, Fifty State Series: L3C & B Corporation Legislation Table (Suffolk
U. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 10-11, Oct. 5, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1561783.
22

23

E.g. H.B. 616. (N.C. 2017); H.B. 467 (N.M. 2017); H.B. 2125 (KS 2017).

24

Rawhouser et al, supra note 3, at 16; Bishop supra note 22.

L3C model legislation was crafted to fit IRS rules so as to be automatically eligible for
IRS-allowed program-related investment (PRI) in for-profit activities that are well aligned with
the purpose of the foundation. The IRS was expected to provide guidance to foundations in
determining if an investment qualifies as IRS-accepted PRI, but has not done so. Without the
IRS ruling, most foundations are wary of making an investment that could be deemed to violate
non-profit rules set by the IRS. The lack of a ruling has likely contributed to L3C legislation stalling.
25
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adopted the L3C form in 2015 but no additional states have a bill in process.26 In
addition to the two most prominent social hybrid forms, additional social hybrid
forms such as Benefit LLCs, Flexible Purpose Corporations (FPC) and Social
Purpose Corporations (SPC) have been adopted by a handful of states such as
California,27 Maryland,28 and Washington.29

Table 1.30

Year

1

2

Benefit Corporation Adoption

L3C Adoption

2008		

VT

2009		

IL, MI, UT, WY

2010

MD, VT

LA, ME, NC*

2011

CA, HI, NJ, VA, NY

RI

2012

IL, LA, MA, PA, SC

2013

AR, AZ, CO, DC, DE, NV, OR, RI, TX

2014

CT, FL, MN, NE, NH, UT, WV

2015

ID, IN, MT, TN

Puerto Rico

No adoptions since 2015, though 8 states
have pending legislation as of 3/1/17 (AK,
GA, IA, KS, KY, MS, NM, OK)

(none)

2016–17
		
		

See e.g. S.B. 979 (P.R. 2015); S.B. 439-157, 2013 Sess. (N.C. 2013) (removing the L3C
statute from the books) Also, one potential reason for the drop-off in legislative support for the
concept is the ABA Business Law Section’s opposition to the Minnesota L3C bill and other similar
bills in progress during the 2012 session.
26

27
See generally Christen Clarke, California’s Flexible Purpose Corporation: A Step Forward, a
Step Back, or No Step at All?, 5 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 301 (2012).
28

Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns §§ 4A-1101–1108 (LexisNexis 2017).

29

H.B. 2239, 62nd Sess. (Wa. 2012); see also Brakman Reiser, supra note 20, at 57–58.

30
Data on individual state statutes based on Carter G. Bishop, Fifty State Series: L3C & B
Corporation Legislation Table (Research Paper 10-11, 2016) https://ssrn.com/abstract=1561783.
*North Carolina adopted the L3C form in 2010 and later repealed it. Anne Field, North Carolina
Officially Abolishes the L3C, Forbes (Jan. 11, 2014, 11:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
annefield/2014/01/11/north-carolina-officially-abolishes-the-l3c/#5f1341853d7f.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol17/iss2/3
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Promotion of Benefit Corporations as a legal entity began when B Lab
provided a model statute that could be used to further the concept to state
legislatures.31 This was part of a larger community-building strategy by B Lab,
a nonprofit organization that describes itself as furthering the cause of “using
business as a force for good. . . .”32 B Lab described Benefit Corporations as
corporations that “incorporat[e] under states’ current corporate statutes and
[are] subject to private-sector tax laws. They differ from traditional corporations (e.g., S corporations, C corporations), though, in that they spell out their
social commitments in their corporate governing documents for all potential
investors to see.”33
Another distinctive attribute of Benefit Corporations is that most have
followed the model legislation which requires that the firm be evaluated or rated
in accordance with an independent third-party social benefit standard.34 B Lab
itself (the promoter of the Benefit Corporation form) is one of many potential
certifiers, with its B corporations standard, which is a voluntary assessment of social
impact.35 Over 1,800 corporations have paid to be certified as a B corporation by
B Lab,36 many of them before Benefit Corporation statutes were passed in their
respective states.37 While Benefit Corporations do not have to choose B Lab as a
certifier, B Lab has worked to build a cadre of existing companies that use their
certification process in order to be Certified B Corps. Early Certified B Corps
include Method (cleaning products), Dansko (shoes), and Patagonia (outdoor
clothing).38 These well-known organizations, together with local entities, provided

31
Our History, B Corporation, (Apr. 20, 2017, 10:05 AM), http://www.bcorporation.net/
what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/our-history.
32

B the Change, http://www.bthechange.com/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).

Michael D. Gottesman, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road Forward for the
Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 345, 355 (2007).
33

34
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, B Lab, 3, (2017). Available at http://benefitcorp.net/
sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf (describing how
benefit corporations must report on their general public benefit, defined as “a material positive
impact on society and the environment, . . . assessed taking into account the impacts of the benefit
corporation as reported against a third-party standard”).
35
This certification is separate from the Benefit Corporation legal status. Although Benefit
Corporations are required to conduct third-party audits of social impact (one alternative of which is
B Lab’s B Corporation certification), B Corporations can obtain an audit and social impact report
regardless of their legal organizational form.

Find a B Corp, B Corporation, https://www.bcorporation.net/community/find-a-b-corp
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
36

37
In this case, the firm would be fulfilling the certification requirement of Benefit Corporation
status, but in its existing corporate form. We acknowledge that there is a significant difference
between certification and corporate form, but in the case of Benefit Corporations, the two go hand
in hand.

Ryan Honeyman, The B Corp Handbook: How to Use Business as a Force for Good
at 1–2 (2014).
38
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clear examples to help legislators understand the newly proposed category. For
instance, as Arizona was considering benefit corporation legislation in 2013, a
legislator asked for an example of social hybrid organizations, and was told about
Goodmans Interior Structures, a Phoenix furniture business.39
With the help of B Lab, interested state legislators across the United States
introduced bills to facilitate the creation of the new social hybrid organizational
forms.40 As illustrated by Table 1, Benefit Corporation statutes started more slowly
than the L3C, but seem to have become the social hybrid organizational form
of choice.41
The L3C as an organizational form has been similarly promoted across the
United States by an organization called Americans for Community Development,
while the other less prominent social hybrid forms (FPC, SPC, and Benefit
LLC) have grown out of more localized working groups.42 These advocacy
groups have collectively played an important role in bringing attention to the
idea of social hybridity, and have performed a lot of the legwork in drafting
legislation to fit within each state’s existing corporate code.43 However, enthusiasm
alone does not always translate into good public policy.
As a complement to the role of advocacy groups and lobbying by individual
attorneys, bar associations acted both in an advisory role and as advocates for (or
against) these hybrid organizational forms. When bar associations chose to become
involved in social hybrid legislation efforts, their influence was substantial.

39
Commerce, Energy and Military Committee Hearing, 51st Legis. (Ariz. 2013) (statement of
Courtney Klein Johnson), http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=12131.
40
In addition to writing and sharing draft legislation with interested and receptive lawmakers,
when he testified before the Arizona Legislature in support of HB 2276 (2013), William Clark, an
attorney representing B Labs, explained that he had spoken with attorneys in all 13 states that had
passed Benefit Corporation laws up until that point. Arizona House Commerce Committee Hearing
on HB 2276 (Az. 2013) (testimony of William Clark).
41

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

How to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, Benefit Corporation, http://benefitcorp.
net/policymakers/how-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation (last visited May 2, 2017); Considering
Legislation in Your State, Am. for Community Dev., https://americansforcommunitydevelopment.
org/considering-legislation-in-your-state/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) (describing how California’s
FPC statute was drafted and promoted by a group of California attorneys called the California
Working Group for New Corporate Forms).
42

43
How to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/
how-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation (last visited May 2, 2017); Considering Legislation in Your
State, Americans for Cmty Dev., https://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/consideringlegislation-in-your-state/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
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III. Role and Description of Bar Associations
Although there are several nationally-recognized bar associations, the most
prominent of these by far is the American Bar Association (ABA).44 The ABA
is a voluntary organization founded in 1878, and today has almost 400,000
members.45 Its stated mission is, “[t]o serve equally our members, our profession
and the public by defending liberty and delivering justice as the national
representative of the legal profession.”46 This mission manifests itself in several
ways, from issuing normative guidelines for attorney participation in pro-bono
work47 to promulgating ethical guidelines for attorney-client interactions.48 The
organization’s involvement, however, is not just limited to regulating attorney
behavior—the ABA often seeks to guide the underlying legal framework of
state and federal laws through public expression of positions as well as more
explicit coordinated lobbying efforts, such as ABA Day, which occurs in April
each year, and encourages members to lobby their congressional representatives.49
These positions usually take the form of resolutions by the ABA House of
Delegates or position papers by the ABA’s other standing committees and address
topics as diverse as breed-specific restrictions on ownership of dogs50 or zerotolerance school discipline policies.51

44
Other multi-state bar associations tend to be organized around particular minority groups
(National Bar Association, made up of predominantly African American Lawyers and Judges),
practice types (American Association for Justice, made up of plaintiffs’ lawyers), or sectors (Federal
Bar Association, made up of government attorneys and the small percentage of attorneys whose
practice is primarily in federal courts).
45
About the ABA, A.B.A. (Apr. 20, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://www.americanbar.org/
about_the_aba.html.
46

Id.

47

E.g. Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (2004).

E.g. Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 441 (2002); Richard L. Abel, Why
Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639 (1981) (providing a more skeptical
perspective); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999)
(concluding that a lawyer may transmit information related to the representation of a client by
unencrypted email without violating the 1998 Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
48

49
Welcome to ABA Day in Washington, A.B.A. (Apr. 20, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://www.
americanbar.org/calendar/aba-day.html (showing that in 2017, the ABA topics were funding
for legal aid and access to justice for homeless veterans); Annual Lobbying by the American Bar
Association, OpenSecrets (last visited Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.
php?id=D000043801 (depicting A.B.A. lobbying expenditures of approximately $1 million
annually since 1998).
50
Opposition to Laws Banning Dogs by Breed Grows, A.B.A. (Sept., 2009) http://www.
americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2013/09/opposition_to_lawsb.html.

ABA Opposes ‘Zero Tolerance’ in Schools, ABC News (Feb. 20, 2002), http://abcnews.
go.com/US/story?id=94043.
51
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State bar associations operate in ways that are similar to the above description
of ABA, with several key differences. First, although state bar associations’
aggregate membership numbers exceed those of the ABA, state bar associations
are independent from one another.52 This leads to variation and diversity in their
responses to the same issue. Second, although some state bars follow the ABA’s
model of voluntary membership, membership in the majority of bar associations are mandatory for all licensed attorneys.53 These differences allow us to
explore rich variation in the contribution these state-level associations make to
the shaping of the hybrid organizational space.54

IV. Bar Associations as Gate Keepers
Bar associations and individual lawyers can play the role of gatekeepers of
the law. Similar to the rise of limited liability corporations (LLC) decades earlier,
both national and state-level bar associations have taken positions or otherwise
participated in the creation of social hybrid legal statutes.55 We first discuss the
involvement of the ABA in social hybrids legislation, then move to an examination
of bar association influence at the state level.56
There is an association to represent the interests of bar association managers (National
Association of Bar Executives, nabenet.org) which exists to share best practices among national,
state, and even local bar organizations, but the underlying state bars have largely retained
the diversity which has arisen from their unique state-level institutional environment and
historical development.
52

53
See Jill M. Kastner, Mandatory vs. Voluntary: Which State Bar is Better?, A.B.A. (last
visited Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/affiliate_home/affiliate_index/
yld_affiliate_septoct08_kastner.html. (contrasting mandatory from voluntary bar associations); Rita
Fuerst Adams, Nebraska Limits State Bar Lobbying, Nat’l Parents Org. (Dec. 11, 2013), https://
nationalparentsorganization.org/blog/16-latest-news/21405-nebraska-limits-state-bar-lobbying.
Mandatory membership broadens the revenue base and potential power of the associations, but
also broadens the constituency, which seems to have a limiting effect—as a result of recent litigation
by dissatisfied bar members, some states have started to place restrictions on the scope of lobbying
activities that can be carried out by mandatory bar associations. See, e.g., In re Nebraska Bar
Association, 841 N.W.2d 167, (Neb. 2013).

Although bar associations also exist at the local level, and some of these are active
in influencing state-level legislation (E.g. Letter from Nancy Sanborn, Chair, Committee on
Corporation Law, New York City Bar, to Senator Squadron (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.nycbar.
org/pdf/report/uploads/20072008-LetteronA.14498BS.7855BAuthorizingtheIncorporationofBen
efitCorporations.pdf ) the vast majority of these local bar associations lack the resources to become
involved with state policy and legislation that does not directly influence the practice of law.
54

See J. William Callison, Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and the Limited Liability
Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded, 26 J. Corp. L. 951, 963 (2000) (observing
that “lawyers were present at the birth of LLCs, and it can be argued that the rapid adoption of the
form resulted from their persuasion and power”). The author of this article takes the position that
the consequences of LLCs were not fully investigated or understood prior to their adoption.
55

56
For a historical comparison of A.B.A. involvement in a movement with similar, though
not identical, goals of blending firm financial performance and social welfare, see e.g. Committee
on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. Law. 2253,
2261 (1990) (Discussing how Pennsylvania in 1983 was the first state to adopt what is called
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Proposals for social hybrid legal forms date back to 2006 with the founding
of B Lab, followed by the 2008 founding of the Americans for Community
Development and passage of L3C legislation by Vermont.57 Law professors and
other commentators were critical in their responses to Vermont and other states
considering the L3C,58 but it was a few more years before the ABA took a public
position on the L3C form and accompanying legislation.59 In 2012, Minnesota
considered adopting the L3C; the Business Law Section of the American Bar
Association sent the Minnesota legislature a position letter strongly opposing the
L3C concept.60 In addition to arguing that the legislation as designed did not
provide any advantages over existing LLC law and that it did not (as planned)
automatically create compliance with federal tax statutes on foundations’
program-related investments, the letter also argued more broadly that social
hybrid organizational forms would inappropriately use the state to create a socially
responsible brand.61 The letter seemed to be effective—Minnesota’s legislature did
not pass the bill, nor has any other state passed L3C legislation since that date.
The ABA Business Law Section has taken a much more measured approach
to the Benefit Corporation concept and accompanying legislation. In August
2013, the Business Law Section published an article entitled Benefit Corporation

a constituency statute, permitting firm directors to consider other constituencies—besides
shareholders—in determining allocations of organizational resources and strategies which now,
twenty-nine other states have done). The expressed ABA position on constituency statutes was that
they were unnecessary and unhelpful.
57

Rawhouser et al., supra note 3, at 15–16.

Compare Arthur Wood, New Legal Structure to Address the Social Capital Famine, 35 Vt.
L. Rev. 45 (2010) (in favor of the new form), with Kleinberger, supra note 5 (calling the L3C “a
snare and a delusion”), and J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit
Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in
Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 273 (2010) (explaining why the L3C “has little or no value
and should be abandoned”).
58

59
At least one observer lamenting state legislatures’ credulous responses to L3C advocates
called for such involvement a year before it happened. Doug Batey, Rhode Island Becomes the Newest
State to Authorize Low-Profit LLCs - What’s Going On Here?, LLC Law Monitor, (Sept. 12, 2011),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ea1f51ed-1ba4-4a14-874a-70ec4becb9e2 (arguing
that “one of the national bodies with expertise and a broad constituency . . . should take this issue
in hand, study it, and make recommendations after thoroughly analyzing the issue and considering
input from the various groups and experts”).

Daniel S. Kleinberger, ABA Business Law Section, on Behalf of its Committees on
LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations, Opposes Legislation for Low Profit Limited Liability
Companies (L3Cs) (Faculty Scholarship, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2012), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2055823
60

61
Professor Kleinberger, whose strong opposition to the L3C aided in killing the idea, was
also on the drafting committee of Minnesota’s Benefit Corporation statute, which passed in 2014.
Letter from Kim Lowe, to Minnesota State Bar Association Public Benefit Corporation Drafting
Committee, (Aug. 6, 2013), https://www.mnbar.org/docs/default-source/sections/business-law--msba_b-corps_august-2013-304a-exposure-draft.pdf?sfvrsn=4 (last accessed 5/2/2017).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2017

11

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 17 [2017], No. 2, Art. 3

468

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 17

White Paper which outlined recommendations for state legislators considering
whether to incorporate the Benefit Corporation into their state’s menu of availa
ble entities.62
Notwithstanding this involvement of the ABA in the social hybrid entities
movement, it is state-level bar associations (and not necessarily the ostensibly
more powerful ABA) that are perhaps best positioned to promote, prevent, or
shape the passage of laws creating new social purpose organizational forms such
as the Benefit Corporation or L3C. This is because doing so requires some
familiarity and involvement with the state legislative process. In this section, we
broadly discuss bar association legislative involvement, then more specifically
with regard to social hybrids legislation.
Bar associations are not uniform in terms of their general levels of legislative
involvement. Table 2a below outlines the state bar associations’ activities as reported
in the 2012 ABA Bar Activities Inventory.63 Several questions arise concerning
governmental relations and bar association involvement in legislative and policy
affairs: (1) Does the association take positions on federal legislation; (2) Does
the association take positions on state legislation; (3) Does the association have
a grassroots lobbying structure in place; and (4) Does the association regularly
engage in training legislators on legal concepts? We summarize responses to these
four questions in Table 2a, below.64

Table 2a. Percent of State Bar Associations Engaging
in Legislative and Lobbying Activities 65
1
Positions on
Federal
Legislation

2

3

Positions on
Grassroots
State
Lobbying
Legislation		

4
Law
Training for
Legislators

Unified Assns.

46.4%

75.0%

32.1%

42.9%

Voluntary Assns.

83.3%

100.0%

72.2%

27.8%

Total

60.9%

84.8%

47.8%

37.0%

62

Corporate Laws Committee, Benefit Corporation White Paper, 68 Bus. Law. 1083 (2013).

A.B.A. Division for Bar Services, 2012 Bar Activities Inventory, at 419–422 (ed.
Joanne O’Reilly, 2012). Of 51 possible jurisdictions (50 states and DC), bar associations from
44 responded to the survey, for a response rate of 86%. There were actually 46 responses in the
2012 survey, because both North Carolina and Virginia have two separate bar associations—one
mandatory, and one voluntary. For these states, we include both sets of responses.
63

64

Id.

65

Id.
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As shown in the table, the legislative activity most common among bar
associations is taking a position on pending state legislation.66 All reporting
voluntary associations and approximately 75 percent of the unified bar associations
indicate a past history of taking public positions on such legislation.67 Associations
also varied in their activities based on their membership structure. Voluntary
associations appear to be more active in legislative affairs, while law training
for legislators is the only activity that unified (mandatory) bar associations were
more likely to become involved in.68 This general observation of greater policy
activity by voluntary bar associations was confirmed by our discussions with bar
representatives. At least one bar representative informed us that their neutral
position on pending social hybrids legislation was the result of being careful
to represent the broad-based interests of its members (none of whom could opt
out of joining the association).69
We turn now to focus on the relationship between overall bar association
characteristics and progress of Benefit Corporation and social hybrid legislation,
summarized in Table 2b below.70 The first observation was that voluntary bar
associations were much more likely to introduce (and pass) both types of social
hybrid laws.71 This makes sense because their voluntary nature means the
associations are less restricted in their ability to innovate and take risks. We also
note that grassroots campaigning bar associations also seemed to be positively
associated with both introduction and passage.72 Next, our data indicates that
bar association participation in legislative training has no clear directional
association with introduction of social hybrid legislation, but does have a clear
negative relationship with adoption for both types of social hybrid laws.73 It may
be that law-trained legislators are more inherently skeptical of these types of
entity innovations, or it may be that the process of law training provides for more
frequent or meaningful advice-giving between legislators and bar association
officials, who then provide their own skeptical perspectives on proposed social
hybrid legal forms. Finally, we note that bar associations willing to take positions

66

Id.

Id. This may occur through a variety of channels, including ad hoc or standing committees
focused on particular legal areas. Several bar associations even have formal legislative or lobbying arms.
See e.g., WSBA Legislative Committees, Wash. State Bar Assoc. (last visited Apr. 20, 2017), http://
www.wsba.org/Legal-Community/Committees-Boards-and-Other-Groups/Legislative-Committee.
67

68

See supra note 65 and accompanying text (Table 2a).

Personal communication with James H. Hahn, Chair, R.I. Bar Ass’n Bus. Org. Comm.
(Apr. 23, 2014).
69

70

See infra note 75 and accompanying text (Table 2b).

71

See infra note 75 and accompanying text (Table 2b).

72

See infra note 75 and accompanying text (Table 2b).

73

See infra note 75 and accompanying text (Table 2b).
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on state legislation seem to have positive association with introduction, and a
negligible relationship of passage of both types of social hybrid laws.74

Table 2b. Relationships Between Bar Association Activities
and Consideration/Passage Of Social Hybridization Laws 75
1

2

3

Introduce
L3C

Pass
L3C

Introduce
BCorp

4

5

Pass Number of
BCorp Associations

Political
Positions and
Legislative
Activities

FedLeg
StateLeg
Grassroots
LegTrain

73.3%
76.2%
78.3%
73.7%

20.0%
19.0%
21.7%
10.5%

83.3%
81.0%
87.0%
73.7%

53.3%
47.6%
52.2%
42.1%

30
42
23
19

Assoc’n
Type

Unified
Voluntary

66.7%
84.2%

20.0%
21.1%

76.7%
84.2%

43.3%
52.6%

30
19

Overall

73.5%

20.4%

79.6%

46.9%

49

The table above shows the relationship between state bar association characteristics with various
social hybrid legislative outcomes. FedLeg indicates that the state bar association is willing to take
positions on proposed federal legislation. StateLeg indicates the same for state legislation. Grassroots
indicates that the state bar association engages in grassroots lobbying campaigns, and LegTrain
indicates that the state bar association is involved in training sessions for state legislatures. Lastly,
Unified indicates a state bar association that requires membership for all licensed attorneys in the
state, while Voluntary indicates that membership in the state bar association is optional for practicing
attorneys, which limits and narrows the scope of its constituency. The totals in Table 2b, Column 5
do not add to 49 because categories overlap with one another.

We move now from a discussion of state bar associations’ general legislative
activity to an exploration of state bar associations’ specific responses to the social
hybrid legislation. State bar associations have had diverse responses to state efforts
to create new hybrid legal forms of organizing. First, bar associations may be
unaware of social hybrid efforts or made an active determination to stay neutral.
Second, bar associations may oppose the legislation, either rejecting the concept
entirely or the specifics of its execution. Lastly, bar associations may support
the legislation, embracing (or at least resignedly accepting) both the underlying
concept and the specifics of the legislation under consideration. We summarize
and categorize the state associations’ representative responses in Table 3 below:

74

See infra note 75 and accompanying text (Table 2b).

75

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Table 3. Representative Bar Association Responses
to Social Hybrid Legislation 76
Bar
Association
Response

Examples

Not Involved NY Benefit Corp—“I am not aware of anything proposed or
at All
New York State bar association involvement with this issue.”77
Choose to
Not Take
a Position

AZ Benefit Corp—“The Bar debated it, but didn’t take a stand
on it. There were some on either side of the issue. They didn’t
make a public statement.”78
RI L3C —“The RI Bar Association is an integrated bar, so we
have a process that must be followed before a formal position
may be taken on any legislation to protect the first amendment
rights of our members. Although no formal position was taken
on the legislation, the consensus of the Business Organizations
Committee was that the legislation was unnecessary to
accomplish its goals under the RI LLC act, . . . the Committee
did not feel strongly enough about the issue to follow the
formal process to take a position on the legislation.“79

Oppose the
Legislation

CO L3C—“Members of the CBA met with the proponents of
the legislation and discussed concerns with the proposal. The
CBA took the position that L3C legislation was unnecessary
and so opposed the bill. The legislation did not pass.”80
LA L3C —“The LSBA OPPOSES this bill with a recom
mendation that Louisiana Law Institute review the bill.”81

76

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

Hermes Fernandez, Bar Involvement in Social Hybrid Legislation in New York (2014).
Interestingly, although the NY State Bar Association was not involved, the NYC Bar Association
took a position on the bill and actively guided its revision and eventual passage. In Florida, the
Jacksonville Bar Association supplemented the state bar’s support of Florida’s Benefit Corporation
legislation. Most local bar associations, however, do not have the size or expertise to publicly support
specific legislative efforts, which is why such involvement most often occurs at the state level.
77

78

Rick DeBruhl, Bar Involvement in Social Hybrid Legislation in Arizona (2014).

79

James Hahn, Bar Involvement in Social hybrid legislation in Rhode Island (2014).

80

Sarah Steinbeck, Bar Involvement in Social hybrid legislation in Colorado (2014).

LSBA Bill Status Report, 4 (2010), http://files.lsba.org/documents/Legislation/2010
PositionBillsOPPOSE.pdf.
81
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Table 3, continued. Representative Bar Association Responses
to Social Hybrid Legislation
Oppose the
Legislation,
continued

CT Benefit Corp—“In 2012, The Connecticut Bar Association
supported the overall concepts underlying filed bills referencing
social enterprise but we opposed the specific bills on the
grounds that they contained a number of impractical provisions
that would limit their usefulness and they created liability
risks that would discourage individuals from serving on the
governing boards of such organizations.”82
CA Benefit Corp —“While we support the enactment of a
new law designed to facilitate the organization of California
businesses with greater flexibility for combining profitability
with a broader social or environmental purpose, the Committee
has come to the conclusion that the Bill is flawed. After due
consideration, the Committee respectfully opposes enactment
of the Bill for the reasons set forth in this letter.”83

Alter the
Legislation

CO Benefit Corp —“We reviewed the language and proposed
changes to make the “Model” language work within Colorado’s
existing business law framework and to address other concerns
with the bill. We discussed the bill with B Lab’s representatives
and the Colorado bill sponsors. Inasmuch as the CBA Business
Law Section had significant reservations with the “Model”
legislation proposed by B Lab and twice proposed alternative
bills, the enactment process was quite contentious and lasted
over four years. Once Delaware adopted a Benefit Corporation
statute, the CBA drafted a similar bill, which, while still being
controversial, was amended and passed . . .”84

Testimony of Hillel Goldman, Bus. Law Section In Support of Governor’s Bill No. 23
An Act Concerning Benefit Corp. and Encouraging Soc. Enter. (Feb. 27 2013) (http://www.cga.
ct.gov/2014/CEdata/Tmy/2014SB-00023-R000227-Hillel%20Goldman,%20CBA-TMY.PDF).
82

83
Letter from The Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of
California to the Honorable Jared Huffman, Member of the Assembly (Apr. 26, 2011) (http://www.
thecorporatecounsel.net/nonMember/docs/04_26_11_AB361.pdf ).
84

Steinbeck, supra note 77.
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Table 3, continued. Representative Bar Association Responses
to Social Hybrid Legislation
Alter the
Legislation,
continued

CT Benefit Corp —“Since the end of the 2012 session and
through the 2013 session, the Section has worked with the
proponents of this legislation, principally B Lab and ReSET,
to draft a Benefit Corporation bill to be introduced which
addresses the technical defects and other shortcomings of prior
bills. Our work is reflected in the present Governor’s bill.”85

Support the
Legislation

PA Benefit Corp —“Within Pennsylvania’s legal and legislative
community, momentum is building for a similar measure,
though action by the General Assembly is not expected before
next year. . . . . The business-law section of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association voted to seek approval for the benefit-corporations
concept from the full membership’s policy-setting arm at a
May 14 meeting.”86

The conclusions and positions of these associations were not the only
differences we noted in legislative testimony and other public documents. We
also noticed a pattern or difference in the logic underlying the associations’
positions. Whether they supported or opposed the legislation, some associations
grounded their position in an underlying business logic, seeing the proposed
hybrid form as a threat (or boon) to traditional for-profit corporations.87 Other
associations grounded their position in a non-profit or charitable logic, seeing
the proposed hybrid form as a positive (or negative) consequence for charitable
organizations.88 Others seemed to be aware of and considering both sectors in
their reaction to the proposed social hybrid legislation.89 We show representative
positions in Table 4 below.

85

Goldman, supra note 79.

Diane Mastrull, Maryland Adopts New Socially Aware Corporation Law (2010), http://
articles.philly.com/2010-04-15/business/25213936_1_corporations-legislation-law.
86

87

See supra note 76 and accompanying text (Table 3).

88

See supra note 76 and accompanying text (Table 3).

89

See supra note 76 and accompanying text (Table 3).
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Table 4. Representative Attorney and Bar Association
Perspectives on Social Hybrid Legal Forms Legislation90

Support

90

For-profit

Non-profit

Both

Social hybrid legal
forms “provide
unprecedented
flexibility to
pursue a higher
corporate purpose
of benefitting
society or the
environment under
higher standards
of accountability
and transparency to
shareholders seeking
such flexibility.”91

“Passage of this
[social hybrid entity]
legislation will help
[socially-minded]
entrepreneurs
tap into these
investment dollars
[which they cannot
do as non-profits]”92

These hybrid entities
pay taxes and can
have shareholders,
without the risk of
being sued for not
maximizing profits.
Companies can
consider the needs of
customers, workers,
the community or
environment and
be well within their
legal right.”93

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

California Assembly Committee on Appropriations Hearing Summary for A.B. 361
(Ca. 2011).
91

92
Connecticut House Commerce Committee Hearing Transcript for HB5466, (CT. 2012),
Testimony of Michael Martone, March 15, 2012.

Hawaii House Committee on Consumer Protection and Commerce Hearing on S.B. 298, (HI.
2011), Testimony of Roger Epstein, March 21, 2011.
93
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Table 4, continued. Representative Attorney and Bar Association
Perspectives on Social Hybrid Legal Forms Legislation

Oppose

For-profit

Non-profit

Both

Under the proposed
social hybrid entity
legislation “there is
little protection for
shareholders who do
not agree with the
directors’ unilaterally
adopted fiduciary
duty standards.
Nor does the Bill
require disclosure
when directors take
actions that do
not fit within the
traditional fiduciary
duty standards.”94

Social hybrid
entity legislation
“introduces a
corporate form with
purposes similar to
those of nonprofit
corporations, but
does not enact
oversight and
accountability
provisions similar
to those applicable
to nonprofit
corporations.”95

“Unfortunately, the
law as it’s written,
really treats non
profits and for profits
like matter and antimatter. You know,
when you combine
the two under one
umbrella, you run
the risk of a big
explosion and the B
corporation is just
one of a myriad of
attempts to try to do
just that.”96

Individual attorneys who testify or are otherwise involved with the social
hybrid entities movement are considerably more favorable toward it. As an
example of this enthusiasm, a Phoenix, Arizona attorney testifying in favor of the
then-pending L3C legislation described hybrid entities as follows:
This is a truly nonpartisan economic stimulus bill. It puts the
onus on private industry to come forward with their socially
beneficial ideas, and to bring those ideas to fruition through
a for-profit business that enjoys some of the benefits that a
nonprofit enjoys, so long as the purpose is for public benefit.97

94
John C. Oehmke, Co-chair of California Bar Association Corporations Committee, Letter
in Opposition to AB 361, April 26, 2011.

Juan Vargas, Chair of the California Senate Committee on Banking and Financial
Institutions, hearing conducted June 15, 2011 (summarizing the concerns of the California Bar
Association’s Nonprofit and Unincorporated Associations Committee).
95

96
Connecticut Joint Committee on Judiciary for HB 5490 (CT 2012), Testimony of John
Horak, March 15, 2012.

Hearing of the Arizona Senate Commerce and Energy Comm., SB 1503 (Az. 2011) (testimony
of Pouria Paknejad).
97
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This tension between attorney enthusiasm and the bar association’s typically
much more conservative approach could be explained by a variety of reasons.
Among them is that individual attorneys may be enthusiastic about a particular
idea but lack the nuanced understanding of the difficulties of smoothly integrating
the idea into a state’s existing corporate or nonprofit code. This is a plausible
explanation, since corporate or nonprofit sections of the bar association are
typically headed by knowledgeable specialists, while individual attorneys may not
have the same specialized expertise or breadth of knowledge about the corporate
code. But even given the same level of legal understanding, the differing incentives
of the two groups—attorney supporters and their associations—may give rise to
different incentives (and reactions) to the social hybridization movement. This
is known as a collective action problem.98 A state’s code is a public good, with
diffuse benefits (costs) associated with incremental positive (negative) changes
in its quality.99 If a social hybrid law is poorly executed such that it creates
diffuse costs across the state’s legal professionals and regular citizens, attorneys
who have clients interested in pursuing social hybrid incorporation may still see
potential for private benefit if the social hybrid laws are passed, with little to
no difference in personal outcome depending on the quality or execution of the
underlying statute.100 On the other hand, innovation can depend on individuals’
and organizations’ willingness to take on risk, and an overly conservative position
could stifle potentially beneficial outcomes for society.
Especially given the mix of incentives among parties involved in the
legislative process, our study highlights the importance of legislative sponsors
and other advocates seeking support from state bar associations to understand
(and if necessary) address any emerging concerns. Bar association opposition
to social hybrid legislation can kill a bill, either by changing the sponsoring
legislators’ minds about the need or usefulness of the social hybrid form, or by

See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,
3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974).
98

Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, The Library of
Economics and Liberty, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html (last visited May
2, 2017).
99

For example, states like Connecticut, Hawaii, and Arizona had individual attorneys
testify in favor of pending legislation. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; Connecticut
House Commerce Committee Hearing Transcript for HB5466, (CT. 2012) (testimony of Michael
Martone); Hawaii House Committee on Consumer Protection and Commerce Hearing on S.B. 298,
(HI. 2011) (testimony of Roger Epstein). But many enthusiastic attorneys took matters a step
further and became involved in drafting legislation as well as advocating for its passage; the California
FPC and Washington SPC working groups were led by attorneys. Stephen R. Chiodini, Goodbye
Flexible Purpose Corporation, Hello Social Purpose Corporation, Lex Mundi Pro Bono Foundation,
http://www.lawforchange.org/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW&ID=6384 (last visited May 4, 2017);
Susan Mac Cormack and Heather Haney, New Corporate Forms: One Viable Solution to Advancing
Environmental Sustainability, 24 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1, 5 (2012); supra note
42 and accompanying text.
100
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delaying its consideration into the next legislative session. Although delay is not
necessarily deadly for a bill, it may be, because these social hybrid proponents
will lose important momentum (and legislative allies) in the push for passage,
especially if legislators retire or lose their seats. There is also a limit on the time
and resources—both physical and social—legislators are willing to spend on
a particular idea. In our review of each state’s legislative record, we found no
example where the state or local bar association openly opposed social hybrid
legislation and the legislation passed.
In several states, Benefit Corporation proponents and sponsoring legislators
failed to obtain and incorporate adequate input from an interested (in and
participating) bar association, which stalled or prevented passage of the social
hybrids bill.101 For example, the Legislative Services Director of the Kansas
Bar Association wrote a letter complaining that the state bar association hadn’t
been adequately consulted in the legislative drafting process, and consequently
asking for the bill to be delayed for additional revisions.102 Unsurprisingly, that
bill died in committee, highlighting the importance of social hybrid proponents’
incorporation of input from state bar associations and other key stakeholders.103

IV. Concluding Discussion and Implications
Until now, our paper has been largely exploratory and descriptive regarding
the characteristics and role of bar associations in the ongoing social hybridization process. We close with several insights based on our analysis and
observations. First, despite our simplified categories of bar association responses
and motivations, we acknowledge that these associations are taking more
nuanced positions. For example, between the support and oppose position is a
reluctant acceptance based on a desire to not get left behind by more quicklyinnovating states. These fast-moving states may have decided that the Benefit
Letter from Joseph N. Molina, Leg. Services Dir., Kansas Bar Ass’n, to The Honorable
Lance Kleeb on H.B. 2650 (Feb. 21, 2014), http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/committees/
ctte_h_cmrce_lbr_1/documents/testimony/20140221_17.pdf (“It was our hope to work together
to create a ‘benefit corporation’ provision [and we are] concerned that without a thoughtful approach
we may end up with a provision that fails to take into account Kansas specific language and other
details unique to our state. The KBA would like to avoid the unnecessary struggles that plagued a
similar bill in Colorado and work together with the proponents to introduce legislation that satisfies
both of our goals.”).
101

102

Id.

Interestingly, a subsequent attempt (HB 2697) failed in 2016, HB 2697, Kansas, 2015–2016
Legislative Sessions, http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/hb2697/ (last
visited May 5, 2017), and although a 2017 version passed the Kansas House of Representatives, HB
2125, Kansas, 2017–2018 Legislative Sessions, http://kslegislature.org/li/b2017_18/measures/
hb2125/ (last visited May 5, 2016) it seems to have stalled in the Senate. See also Hans Rawhouser,
Michael E. Cummings, and Alfred Marcus, Sustainability Standards and Stakeholder Engagement:
Lessons from Carbon Markets, Organization and Environment, forthcoming (highlighting the
importance of stakeholder involvement in effective regulatory and standard-setting efforts).
103
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Corporation as a commonly-accepted entity was inevitable after Delaware passed
its statute. Or perhaps there was a more gradual tipping point once legislation
passed in a sufficient number of states. One apparent example is the Minnesota
State Bar Association representative’s testimony before the legislature:
There are twenty-one other states that have passed legislation
like this. There are a whole host of states, probably ten, doing
the same thing we are, and anticipating passing legislation like
this. So at some point we are going to need to recognize that
other states are doing this, and so we need to make sure that
we know how to treat these entities when they are formed in
Wisconsin or another state and they come here.104
Second, we recognize that although bar associations may potentially play
an important role in shaping the creation of new organizational forms that are
directed at improving society, their presence was not actively felt in all states.
As gatekeepers of the law, policy makers should perhaps be better about seeking
(and heeding) state bar association advice about whether a particular social entity
innovation is necessary or desirable, and if so, how it can best be incorporated
into the state’s existing corporate code. Although individual proponents or
organizations such as B Lab or the Association for Community Development
have enthusiasm for a particular policy solution, they generally lack the specific
expertise to understand a particular state’s sociopolitical and legal context, and
may therefore advocate a particular form that is ill-suited.105 The state’s corporate
bar can act as a realistic and pragmatic check on the (sometimes) idealistic or
unrealistic positions taken by social hybrid proponents.
Finally, although our study provides some insight into the role of bar
associations in this social hybridization process, future research could expand

Minn. H. of Rep. Civil Law Comm. Hearing on SF 2053 (Mn. 2014). (testimony of
Kim Lowe, chair of the Minnesota State Bar Association Public Benefit Corporation Act
Drafting Committee).
104

For example, after the the Benefit Corporation bill was designated as high priority, the
Nebraska Bar association did not take a public position nor did it testify in the legislature regarding
the bill. Nebraska House Committee Hearing Announcing Priority Bills, 103 Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb.
2014) http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/103/PDF/Journal/r2journal.pdf#page=617.
Instead, Nebraska legislators heard William Clark, an attorney from Philadelphia representing B
Lab, tout the idea without any caution or advice about how to make the statute fit with Nebraska’s
existing corporate code. Danielle Conrad, Benefit Corporations Considered, Unicameral Update
(Feb 4, 2014), http://update.legislature.ne.gov/?p=14439. Similarly, when William Clark testified
in Arizona at the introduction of that state’s Benefit Corporation Statute, he acknowledged that he
hadn’t yet spoken with local attorneys about their ideas for tailoring the law to better fit the existing
code. Arizona House Commerce Committee Hearing on HB 2276 (Az. 2013) (“We’re planning to
have discussions with the Arizona bar”). Another example of a potentially “bad fit” policy is the
aforementioned North Carolina adoption (then later revocation) of the L3C form.
105
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on our work by exploring in more detail the role of other associations such as
those representing for-profit or nonprofit sectors. Even within the same sector,
reactions to social hybridization were varied. For example, nonprofit associations
in Montana and Connecticut testified in support of social hybrid legislation,106
while nonprofit associations in California and Minnesota very publicly opposed
it,107 and a nonprofit association in Michigan took a neutral position.108 A fruitful
study could study antecedents, process, and consequences of such actions.

106
Montana House Committee on Business and Labor Hearing on H.B. 534, 63rd Sess. (Mt.
2013); Connecticut Senate Committee on Commerce Hearing on H.B. 6356, (Ct. 2013), Testimony
of Jeff Shaw, Director of Public Policy, Connecticut Association of Nonprofits (“The existence
of benefit corporations in Connecticut would present a valuable opportunity for nonprofit
organizations to create financial partnerships that could provide them with new, sustainable sources
of operating revenue.”).
107

See e.g. Mark Hrywna, Benefit Corporation in California Meets Chill in San Francisco, Non-

profit Times (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/benefit-corporation-

in-california-meets-chill-in-san-francisco/; Interview with Barbara Jacobs, Attorney and member
of Minnesota State Bar Association Public Benefit Corporation Drafting Committee, Minn. (July
22, 2013).
108

S.B. 360, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mi. 2011).
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